Since its establishment, the state of Israel has had to cope with waves of terrorism and terrorist activity at its, borders, inside Israel itself and in the Territories. These terror attacks have necessitated the swift and consistent development of technological means, military doctrines, and general policy for counter terrorism. Many years of experience in dealing with terror and terrorist activity has crystallized into accepted Israeli strategy.
 

Israeli counter terrorist activity cosists of three main components:

Operative Measures activity initiated by the army and security forces against terrorist targets in their area. Defensive Operations – activity that is meant to put obstacles in the way of terrorist squads and disrupt their attempts to launch terror attacks. Punitive Measures – legal activity, which is aimed at punishment of the planners and the operatives of terror attacks, as well as the supporters of terrorist organizations

The first two components of counter terrorist activity can be distinguished from one another in their application to different stages of a terror attack. The offensive activities are aimed mainly to prevent the implementation of planning in the primary organizational stages or the training stage of terror attacks. Defensive activities aim at disrupting attempted terror attacks while the squads are on their way to the target and at the beginning of the attack. The punitive measures, on the other hand, apply to the attack in all its stages, from the planning stage to the actual implementation of the attack.

Following are some of the aims at the basis of Israeli counter terrorist activities:
Minimizing the extent of terrorist activity and the resulting damage
- Since the state of Israel must contend with terror organizations which are often located in territories outside of its control, it is not within her power to destroy the organizations through classic military action. The aim, therefore, is to reduce the number of terror attacks and to minimize direct and secondary damage. In this context, Itzhak Rabin, then Defense Minister stated in September 1989 that: “The goal we set ourselves in the campaign against terror is not one of elimination, but to minimize our vulnerability and delivery of the strongest possible blows against terrorists…”

Damage to terrorist squads
- As a result of the ambition to minimize the extent of terrorist activity, the IDF centralizes its efforts by attacking terrorist squads in their different organizational stages: in training camps, during terrorist activities, on their way to Israeli territory, during their border crossing or even during their stay in Israel itself.

Going after terrorist leaders and planners - Another objective of the counter terrorist strategy is a precise and methodical strike at the leaders of terrorist organizations and the functionaries directly responsible for the planning and execution of terror attacks.

Strikes at terror infrastructure
- Striking at the military infrastructure of terrorist groups in their own backyard forces them to commit extensive resources to rebuild the affected areas, and this is likely to disrupt their plans for terror assaults in Israel.

Undermining terrorist morale
- Counter terrorist operations are directed, inter alia, at the morale of terrorists and their supporters. Terror groups are constantly active in enlistment of new recruits, and they require a very wide array of supporters and collaborators. Successful anti-terror campaigns undermine their self-confidence, block enlistment efforts and deter collaborators.

Following the decision to carry out a strike against terrorist bases, decision-makers are faced with several options, including aerial bombardment, land incursion, naval operations, and pinpoint strikes against terrorist leaders.

Air Force bombardments -
The most readily accessible means likely to meet most of the requirements of the war on terror, and without any need for complex advance preparations, is aerial bombardment.

Among the targets bombed by the airforce in recent years were command centers, training bases, staging areas, equipment and ammunition depots, living quarters, military positions, bunkers, and special facilities such as terrorist radio stations.

The use of the airforce against terrorist targets, has lead, to some extent, to the adaptation of terrorist organizations, and their establishing policies aimed at reducing the number of casualties and air force efficiency. Among these policies we will mention:

Settling next to civilian population centers
– This policy is supposed to make it harder for the airforce to hit terrorist targets without loss of life or property of civilians.

No extended stay in bases
- During a “deep attack” of the airforce in Lebanon in October 1986 (southeast of Tripoli), according to Palestinian sources 7 terrorists were injured and 2 citizens. “One of the military commanders of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine – Abu-Haled - explained the small number of casualties: there is a policy that forbids the terrorists to stay in the base for fear of an attack.”

Among the additional disadvantages of an aerial attack there is the problem of accuracy. Despite the professionalism of IDF pilots, the timing, and the accuracy of its operations, during the years of its activity against terrorist targets, there were a few cases where the hits were inaccurate. This lack of accuracy at best results in an incomplete mission. However, in the worst cases it can cost the lives of Lebanese citizens.

Ground Incursions
- There are circumstances in which aerial bombardments have limitations: For example well-fortified positions, caves cut into a mountainside, proximity of civilian population and thick concentration of anti-aircraft canons. The drawbacks sometimes result in a decision to use infantry.

The land-based raid enables the destruction of a military target situated in a heavily populated area, while minimizing the risks to civilians. However, this type of counter terrorism involves a great risk to the lives of the fighters, penetrating hostile territory, carrying out their task and retreating back to Israeli territory. The number of fighters involved in such campaigns is much larger than those required for aerial bombardment. Even raids that involve only small units may, for a number of reasons, develop into campaigns much larger than was originally intended.

Naval Attacks
- Offensive action from the sea usually accompanies air force bombardment or land raids. Navy ships in this scenario serve as mobile sea-going artillery, “softening” targets before incursion by ground forces, or as an adjunct to aerial bombardments. As part of its offensive action, the IDF has also used the navy against naval bases and boats belonging to terror organizations, in order to disrupt their efforts to ferry operatives and weapons into Lebanon.

Strikes Against Terrorist Leaders
- While attacks on field targets may succeed despite a deviation from the plan during its practical implementation, hitting terrorist leaders demands precise intelligence, extremely complex planning and flawless execution. After the September 1985 air force bombing in Tunis, the late Yitzhak Rabin then Minister of Defense defined the policy of striking at terrorist leaders: “My understanding of terror is simple: there is no solution based on a single blow, there is no campaign that can solve the problem. What is needed, using preventative strikes and other methods, is to reduce vulnerability. The second element is to mete out the maximum punishment to perpetrators and their handlers. I am not referring here to personal terror against someone, but rather to a viewpoint. We must strike not just at the field and operational level, but also the command, control, and financial systems.” Pursuing terrorist leaders therefore has a dual function: prevention of future terror, and punishment of those responsible for the attacks. Major-General Amnon Shahak, then head of IDF intelligence, explained the justification of striking at terrorist leaders in April 1988: “In my opinion, terrorist leaders are a proper target for elimination. Anyone who conducts terror against us ought to be a target.”

The elimination of terrorist leaders may hurt the stability of the organization and terrorist morale. It can increase tensions and personal competition among heirs, sabotage planned terror attacks, and obligate the organization to use a great deal of resources to find hiding places and to protect its leaders.

Defensive operations are meant to put obstacles in the way of the terrorist squads and disrupt their attempts to carry out terrorist attacks in Israel. The three basic aims are deterrence, warning and prevention.

Some see the punitive component as an inseparable part of the general defensive operation. Although it is possible to treat it as an independent factor, as opposed to defensive activity aimed at damaging the terrorists’ ability to carry out attacks. Law and punishment are legal acts, aimed at punishing, to the full extent of the law, the planners and the operatives of terrorist attacks, from the terrorists’ accomplices to the supporters of terrorist organizations.

When looking at the existing law and punishment system in Israel dealing specifically with terrorist organizations, we must differentiate between the legal system in the territories and the system that is used in Israel

In the Territories - There is an extensive punitive system against terrorism, which includes arrest, administrative detention, exile, and sealing and destroying houses of proven terrorists.

Inside Israel
- Recently several new prohibitions have entered legislation aimed directly at those who assist, support and or are members of terrorist organizations. These laws are intended to deter Israeli citizens from such activities. Certain regulations have also been established during the years to secure certain policies in the framework of civil defense against terror attacks. These policies have been established after particularly bloody terror attacks, among them the parental duty to guard the gates of schools.